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Claims & Opinions
An Exchange of Views

GAME THEORY AND BANKRUPTCY
REORGANIZATIONS
by
David Gray Carlson*

Everyone knows that the place to look for the source of suspicious results is
the description at the start of the model. If that description is not clear, the
reader deduces that the model's counterintuitive results arise from bad assumptions concealed in poor writing. 1

I.

INTRODUCTION

In an innovative and challenging article, 1 Professors Douglas G.
Baird and Randal C. Picker employ game theory to illustrate the meaning
of the Bankruptcy Code's 8 automatic stay and the controversial "new
• Professor of Law , Benjamin N . Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University. The author
would like to thank Michael Herz, Donald Korobkin, John McGinnis, Jeanne Schroeder, Stewart
Sterk , J ack Williams, Charles M . Yablon, an anonymous reviewer for the Journal of Legal Studies,
and the Game Theory Workshop at the Benjamin N . Cardozo School of Law for help withs• , where
s t S, even though ,r :$ 0.
1
ERIC RASMUSEN , GAMES AND INFORMATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY 16
(I 989) [hereinafter Rasmusen] .
• Douglas G. Baird & Randal C. Picker, A Simple Noncooperative Bargaining Model of Corporate Reorganizations, 20 J . LEGAL STUD. 311 (1991) [hereinafter Baird & Picker].
3
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified at 11 U.S.C. §§
101 - 1330), as amended by Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L .
No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (codified as amended in various sections 11 U.S.C . and 28 U .S.C.); Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-
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value exception" to the absolute priority rule. According to their research,
the automatic stay causes secured creditors to waive their cram down
rights, 4 while the new value exception to the absolute priority rule allows
shareholders to foist low liquidation values on secured creditors. 11
Even though these important discoveries apparently contradict each
other, 6 Baird and Picker attribute profound significance to their research.
According to Baird and Picker, "[o]nce the dynamics of bargaining in
bankruptcy are understood, a number of the central assumptions of modern bankruptcy scholarship need to be revised." 7 However, a careful reading of their article reveals that these central assumptions of bankruptcy
scholarship are not in need of revision after all. Rather, the discoveries of
Baird and Picker are only the result of serious blunders in legal research
and a priori reasoning.
A.

Their Legal Error

Baird and Picker's legal error involves bankruptcy's automatic stay
provision. The automatic stay is the statutory injunction requiring creditors to stop all postpetition collection activities other than those that the
Bankruptcy Code authorizes. 8 The automatic stay thus guarantees that
the bankruptcy court will have a monopoly over the fate of the bankrupt
554, 100 Stat. 3114 (codified as amended in yarious sections of 11 U.S.C. and 28 U .S.C.); Retiree
Benefits Bankruptcy Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-334, 102 Stat. 610 (codified as amended
in various sections of 11 U.S.C .); Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508,
104 Stat. 1388 (codified as amended in various sections of 11 U .S.C .); Criminal Victims Protection
Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-581, 104 Stat. 2865 (codified as amended in various sections of 11
U.S.C .); Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L . No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4789 (codified as amended in
various sections of 11 U.S.C. and 28 U.S .C .); Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101650, 104 Stat. 5089 (codified as amended in various sections of 11 U .S.C. and 28 U .S.C .); and ,
Treasury Postal Service and General Government Appropriations Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-509,
104 Stat. 1389 (codified as amended in various sections of 28 U .S.C.) [hereinafter Bankruptcy Code
or Code].
• Baird & Picker, supra note 2, at 324 ("As long as Creditor has no ability to lift the automatic
stay, Manager needs to pay no attention to [liquidation] value when she bargains.").
• Id. at 325 ("[T]he new value exception enables Manager to force Creditor to take a share of
Firm equal to the liquidation value of Firm's assets. She can capture for herself the difference, the
entire going-concern surplus, without needing to reach a consensual bargain.").
• These discoveries are contradictory because, on the one hand, the automatic stay makes cram
down useless, but, on the other hand , the secured creditors can be made to take the liquidation value
of their collateral - a cram down idea. Thus, Baird & Picker cannot decide whether cram down
exists. See infra text accompanying notes 39, 69.
7
Baird & Picker, supra note 2, at 312; see also id. at 349 (stating that "our model also allows
us to question some of the basic assumptions of bankruptcy scholarship of the past decade").
• 11 U .S.C. § 362(a) (1988).
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firm.
Such an injunction obviously strengthens the hand of management in
any negotiation over restructuring the firm. Baird and Picker, however,
show something that is not obvious: The automatic stay also compels a
secured creditor to waive the protection known colloquially as "cram
down." 9 Roughly speaking, cram down guarantees that a secured creditor
will obtain the value of the secured creditor's collateral from the reorganization proceeding.
This comment will show that Baird and Picker support their conclusion - that the automatic stay negates cram down - with defective legal
research. Baird and Picker assume that, while a secured creditor can block
confirmation of a plan that violates the creditor's cram down rights, the
creditor cannot obtain relief from the automatic stay, even though no confirmable plan has been proposed. In the Baird and Picker model, the secured creditor can recover nothing without kicking back to management
some of the value that cram down guarantees to the creditor.
This view misapprehends the position of the secured creditor. The
Supreme Court of the United States, in United Savings Ass'n v. Timbers
of Inwood Forest Associates, 10 ruled that a debtor's failure to propose a
viable plan within a reasonable time constitutes routine grounds for relief
from the automatic stay. 11 Therefore, while the automatic stay necessarily
strengthens the negotiating position of a debtor, it does not emasculate
cram down, as Baird and Picker aggressively claim. Only an automatic
stay that can never be removed does so.

B.

Their Logical Error
Baird and Picker's second mistake, a purely logical error, involves the

• Baird & Picker state: "The traditional view holds that the automatic stay does not itself prevent the secured creditor from enjoying the liquidation value of the assets. Under some circumstances,
however, the automatic stay and the dynamics of bargaining may make the liquidation value of the
assets irrelevant." Baird & Picker, supra note 2, at 313. Baird & Picker also state:
[T]he liquidation value of the asset that Creditor would be able to enjoy outside of bankruptcy becomes irrelevant. As long as Creditor has no ability to lift the automatic stay,
Manager needs to pay no attention to that value when she bargains. The Bankruptcy Code
gives Creditor the right to prevent the confirmation of a plan that does not give it the
liquidation value of Firm's assets, but this right does it no good in any negotiations with
Manager.
Id . at 324.
10

484 U.S. 365 (1988).
Baird & Picker cite Timbers but do not adopt the Court's description of the automatic stay in
their model. Baird & Picker, supra note 2, at 323 n.30. Rather, they write that , "in a case in which
Firm does have a going-concern surplus, most courts are unlikely ever to lift the stay." Id. at 323.
11
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new value exception to the absolute priority rule. According to Baird and
Picker, the new value exception allows old shareholders to "cash out" uncooperative secured creditors at low valuations.12 In fact, no causal connection exists between the new value exception and cash-out of uncooperative creditors.
According to the absolute priority rule, if a class of unsecured creditors does not receive payment in full under a plan of reorganization, that
class can insist that "the holder of any claim or interest that is junior to
the claims of such class will not receive or retain under the plan .. . any
property." 13 Some courts and commentators suggest that the absolute priority rule does not apply if a former equity claimant agrees to forego the
old equity interest and instead purchases newly issued stock in exchange
for new value. 14 This scenario describes the new value exception to the
absolute priority rule.
For example, suppose that a firm (Firm) is worth S3 million liquidated and SS million as a going concern. Suppose further that a reorganization plan proposes to give a secured creditor (Creditor) rights worth $3
million and the general creditors rights worth $2 million .10 According to
the absolute priority rule if general creditors claim over $2 million, they
may insist that the former equity claimants (Manager) receive no property under the plan. On the other hand, under the new value exception,
Firm can issue new shares to Manager for new value.
Critics assert that the new value exception provides Manager with an
opportunity to arbitrage between a bankruptcy court's low valuation of
Firm and Firm's real market value.18 For example, suppose a bankruptcy
11

Id. at 325.
11 U .S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) ( 1988). See also 11 U .S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(C)(ii) (I 988) (giving a
similar right to preferred equity claimants vis-a-vis junior equity claimants). Secured creditors have
no similar right. See 11 U.S .C. § 1129(b)(2)(A) (1988). H owever, the Code treats understcured
creditors (the type of creditor that Baird and Picker concentrate on) as having two claims: one fully
secured and the other fully unsecured. 11 U .S.C . § 506(a) (1988). Hence, undersccured creditors have
absolute priority rights in their capacity as holders of completely unsecured claims.
,. See, e.g., Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 121 (1939). For a history
and assessment of the absolute priority rule and the new value exception, sec John D. Ayer, Rethinlr.ing Absolute Priority After Ahlers, 87 MICH. L. REV. 963 (1989); Bruce A. Markell , Owners, Auctions, and Absolute Priority in Banlr.ruptcy R eorganizations, 44 STAN. L. REV. 69, 97-98 (1991 );
Ralph A. Peeples, Staying In: Chapter I I, Close Corporations and the Absolute Priority Rule, 63
AM . BANKR . L.J. 65 (1989 ).
11
The Tarzan-like terminology and the numbers in this comment have been chosen to conform
to the rhetoric and examples used by Baird and Picker. See Baird & Picker, supra note 2.
11
Elizabeth Warren, A Theory of Absolute Priority, 1991 ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 9, 19 (1991).
This assertion is especially suspicious when the old shareholders have the exclusive right to bid for the
new equity shares. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Bryson Props. , XVIII (In re Bryson Props., XVIII) , 961
11

Game Theory
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court values Firm at $5 million and allows Manager to buy all the newly
issued common shares of Firm for a dollar. If Firm is really worth $6
million, Manager has arbitraged between the poor valuation and the real
market value. 17 In other words, Manager bought $1 million in equity for
a dollar. For this reason, the new value exception is controversial. 18
Baird and Picker recognize the existence of the above argument but
instead attempt to formulate an original theory. 18 According to their analysis, the new value exception allows Manager to cash out Creditor for a
low liquidation value while reserving the going concern surplus for
Manager. 20
As mentioned previously, no logical connection exists between the
new value exception and the cash-out opportunity that Baird and Picker
describe. Indeed, the cash-out opportunity does not depend on the new
value exception at all. Rather, it comes from cram down, whereby a plan
can be confirmed over the opposition of Creditor, provided that the plan
guarantees Creditor the value of its collateral. Cram down will exist even
if absolute priority is applied without exception. Therefore, to the extent
that Baird and Picker wished to provide ammunition for the growing
right-wing attack on the new value exception, they failed.
Baird and Picker misstate the applicable legal rules and then make a
key logical error. Their model does not prove that, in real life, cram down
does not exist or that the new value exception allows cram down at liquidation values. Because of this essential shortcoming, it is unnecessary at
this time to revise the "central assumptions of modern bankruptcy scholarship," as Baird and Picker recommend. 21

II.

ASSUMPTIONS OF THE MODELS

Baird and Picker explore the effect of the automatic stay and the new
value exception on bargaining. Accordingly, they combine the following
factors to generate four different game theory models:
F.2d 496, 504 (4th Cir. 1992), etrt. dtnud, 61 U.S.L.W. 3260 (1992) (striking down plan that
exclusively reserved new shares for old shareholders).
17
For a general discussion of arbitrage opportunities presented in the Bankruptcy Code, see
David Gray Carlson, Undersecured Claims Under the Banhruptcy Code Sections 506(a) and
J ll J(b): Second Loo/is at Judicial Valuations of Collateral, 6 BANKR. DEV. J. 253 (1989).
11
The Solicitor General requested the Supreme Court to declare the exception dead, but the
Court declined to do so. Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U .S. 197, 203 n.3 (1988).
11
Baird & Picker, supra note 2, at 313, 325-26.
20
Id . at 327-28.
11
Id. at 312.
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Automatic Stay
New Value
Exception

No

Yes

No

1

2

Yes

3

4

Model One contains neither the automatic stay nor the new value exception, while Model Four includes both of them. Models Two and Three
each have one of the features but not both.
The models share the following background assumptions:
(1) Firm's going concern value (VM) exceeds liquidation value (Vc) That is, VM > Vc. 22
(2) Creditor's perfected security interest encumbers all assets. 23
(3) Creditor's claim dwarfs any conceivable value attributed to Firm,
whether it be Vc or VM· 24 Essentially, to comprehend the Baird and
Picker model, the reader should treat the claim of Creditor as infinite
because Baird and Picker imply that Creditor cannot be paid off or cashed
out without the aid of the new value exception. 25 In contrast, suppose Vc
is $3 million, VM is $5 million, and the secured claim is $3.1 million. On
these numbers, Manager could always deprive Creditor of most of the
going concern surplus simply by paying off the secured claim. 28 However,
because the secured claim is greater than any value of Firm, this simple
redemption strategy is not available.
(4) VM > Ve solely because of Manager's entrepreneurial talent. 27
31
Baird and Picker define fl as "the greater of V Mor the sum of WM and Ve" Id . at 334. VM is
the value of Firm if Manager remains in control of Firm. Id . WM is the amount of wages Manager
foregoes voluntarily by staying with Firm. Id. at 333-34. As the appendix shows, WM is best set at
zero so that fl declines to the greater of VM or Ve. Yet when Ve >VM, Firm ought to liquidate
because no going concern value exists. As the Baird and Picker model pertains only to chapter 11 and
not to chapter 7, we can ignore cases where Ve > VM ' This assumption, for purposes of this article,
mtans that VM = fl. This comment simplifies the Baird and Picker models by eliminating fl as a
variable and instead substituting VM "
••Id.at 319.
•• Id. at 314.
•• Id. at 325.
28
H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 414 (1977) , reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6370.
("One requirement applies generally to all classes before the court may confirm under [ 11 U.S.C . §
I 129(b)(2)]. No class may be paid more than in full.").
17
Baird & Picker, supra note 2, at 315, 339.
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Manager can deprive any creditor of a share of VM simply by quitting
Firm and pursuing other opportunities.
(5) Manager has the power, derived from the automatic stay, to
stretch out a bankruptcy proceeding forever. 28
(6) Manager's monopoly power over VM is not complete: Creditor's
consent is necessary for any chapter 11 plan. 29 In two of the models, however, Manager can cash out Creditor at liquidation value, so Creditor has
no such power.
(7) Manager always enjoys a minimum share of VM: the opportunity
cost of staying with Firm (WM). 30 Baird and Picker refer to this as Manager's "exit option. " 31 WM exists because the wage Manager chooses to
pay itself from Firm is below the wage Manager could earn in the market. 32 WM therefore constitutes wages that could be received elsewhere minus wages actually received from Firm. 33
(8) Manager and Creditor split VM evenly, so long as .5VM> (Ve,
WM). 34 This assumption, called "equal patience," is defined as equal rates
of return on any investment. 311
(9) If Ve > .5VM> Creditor will threaten to exit Firm and take Ve
through foreclosure, if legally permitted to do so, unless Manager pays
Creditor Ve through the chapter 11 plan. If Manager pays Ve, however,
,. Id. at 323; see also id. at 322 ("[F]or the sake of simplicity, we subsume within the notion of
lifting the automatic stay any avenue open to Creditor, such as being able to confirm a liquidating
plan , that allows it to reach and dispose of Firm 's assets. ").
•• Id. a t 322.
•• Id. at 323-24.
•• Id. at 319.
•• l(i . at 320 n.23.
•• Baird and Picker needlessly complicate their model by assuming that Manager receives a
subcompetitive cash wage paid before VM is split. As a result, Manager must always receive the
bal a nce (W_11 ) from V,w WM therefore constitutes Manager's minimum share of VM.
If Baird and Picker assumed that Manager's cash wage precisely equalled Manager's opportunity cost, then Manager's share of VM would consist purely of economic rent. In such a case, WM =
0, thereby considerably simplifying Baird and Picker's model; but because Manager must now capture part of VM to remain with Firm, WM constitutes a minimum that Manager must always receive.
At times, Baird and Picker claim that if Manager exits, Manager can still obtain WM from VM
upon Firm's liquidation. Id . at 339 n.60 (stating that if Creditor forecloses, "Manager will insist on
receiving at least her alternative wage WM• leaving Creditor no more than" VM - WM). This assertion
is clearly erroneous because VM represents the value of Firm as a going concern. Id. at 338. Additionally, while making the claim that Manager will receive WM from VM upon Firm's liquidation, Baird
and Picker forget that WM is not the alternative wage but merely the difference between the alternative wage and what Manager chose to pay itself from Firm assets.
" Baird & Picker, supra note 2, at 341.
•• Id. at 339.
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Creditor demands no further share of VM. 88
(10) Other general creditors have already acquiesced to any bargain
Creditor and Manager reach. The price of their acquiescence is a "fixed
cost." 87 That is, VM comprehends that the general creditors already either
negotiated or received payment. Of course, these creditors have absolute
priority rights of their own, but they have waived these rights and will
never assert them.
Many of these assumptions are in contradiction and, as a result, the
models contain some impossible absurdities. These contradictions, however, are not pertinent to the two basic criticisms presented here. Those
interested in how the modeling works (or, more precisely, how it careens
out of control) are directed to the appendix.

III.

THE FOUR MODELS

The following are the four models that Baird and Picker devised to
explain the significance of the automatic stay and the new value exception
to the absolute priority rule.

A.

Model One: No Automatic Stay, No New Value Exception

In this first model, Creditor has the option of liquidating Firm because the automatic stay" does not prevent this action. Therefore, it follows
that any consensual reorganization plan must give Creditor at least liquidation value. If liquidation value, Vc, is less than .5VM• Creditor's share is
. 5VM· If Vc > .5VM • Creditor must take Vc , and Manager takes VM - Vc·
Hence, Creditor's minimum share is the greater of Vc or . 5VM · Baird and
Picker diagram this result as follows:

<

" Id . at 340-41. The appendix criticizes the assumption that Creditor can extract rents when Vc
.5VM but not when Ve> .5VM .
., Id . at 316.
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C

sc--~-<

...
.•• M

Sc

Ve

Figure One
Creditor's Share--No Automatic Stay

In this diagram, VM is a fixed amount. Vc varies, moving from left to
right on the abscissa. The solid and dotted lines represent the shares of
Creditor and Manager, respectively. The straight line emanating from
. 5VM indicates a fifty-fifty split of VM• until Vc > .5VM on the abscissa.
After that, Creditor obtains more than . 5VM> or V c·88

B. Model Two: Automatic Stay, No New Value Exception
In the second model, Baird and Picker assume the automatic stay can
never be lifted so long as VM > Vc· As a result of this assumption, Creditor and Manager split VM fifty-fifty , even as the liquidation value (the
abscissa) registers a very high value. Baird and Picker diagram this point
as follows:

11
M any problems are inherent in Model One; however, these problems are not pertinent to the
main purpose of this comment. The appendix contains all critiques of this model.
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VM
Payoff~Ct'-:-:-::_,-,,_.,,._:-:_-:-::-=-=--=--=--_::-:_~~
M

Ve

Figure Two
. Permanent Automatic Stay

In this model, Baird and Picker reach the important conclusion that
Creditor loses the right to a minimum of liquidation value. In other
words, cram down rights of secured creditors are meaningless because of
the automatic stay. This claim that the automatic stay cancels cram down
is revolutionary. Most lawyers believe that cram down rights constitute
the minimum a secured creditor must receive, although a secured creditor
can waive these rights. 39
Baird and Picker's assumption, however, is the product of incomplete
legal research. If Manager cannot present a confirmable plan, the automatic stay can be lifted, either for cause, or because the encumbered assets
are not necessary for an effective reorganization within the meaning of
section 362(d)(2).' 0 The Supreme Court itself demanded this result. Ac•• See In re Allegheny Int'!, Inc. , 118 B.R. 282, 299 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1990) ("[T]he technical
provisions of the Code, such as the automatic stay, arc designed to achieve the purposes of the reorganization process and to maximize results for alt creditors. These provisions are not designed to
create del ay and pressure claimants to sell.").
•• See, e.g., Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U .S. 197, 199-201 ( 1988) (dismissing
chapter 11 because the bankruptcy court could not confirm any plan); Novak v. DeRosa, 934 F.2d
401 (2d Cir. 1991) (dismissing the bankruptcy proceeding because of failure to present confirmable
plan within statutory period); In re 400 S. Main St., 128 B.R. 323 (Bankr. D. R.I. 1991) (granting
secured creditor relief from the stay because debtor failed to demonstrate the reasonable possibility of
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cording to Justice Scalia m United Savings Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood
Forest Associates: 0
Once the movant under [section] 362(d)(2) establishes that he is an undersecured creditor, it is the burden of the debtor to establish that the collateral
at issue is "necessary to an effective reorganization." See [section) 362(g).
What this requires is not merely a showing that if there is conceivably to be
an effective reorganization, this property will be needed for it; but that the
property is essential for an effective reorganization that is in prospect. This
means . .. that there must be a "reasonable possibility of a successful reorganization within a reasonable time .. . ." And while the bankruptcy courts
demand less detailed showings during the four months in which the debtor
is given the exclusive right to put together a plan . .. , even within that
period lack of any realistic prospect of effective reorganization will require
[section] 362(d)(2) relief...

If one is inclined to give credence to Supreme Court dicta, 43 then the
automatic stay does not require the secured creditor to waive cram down
rights. Rather, Timbers indicates that a secured creditor may have relief
from the automatic stay when Manager insists on a kickback from the
cram down. This implies that Model One is a closer approximation of the
automatic stay, as it has been authoritatively interpreted, than Model
a successful reorganization with a reasonable period of time) .
., 484 U .S. 365 (1988).
" Id. at 374-77 (footnotes and citations omitted). This dicta resolved an earlier connict in cases
that were either very pro-debtor or very anti-debtor. Compare In re Rassier , 85 B.R. 524, 527-30
(Bankr. D. Minn. 1988) (ruling that a debtor need not show likelihood of a successful plan) with In
re Planned Sys., Inc., 78 B.R . 852, 865-66 (Bankr. S.D . Ohio 1987) (holding that the plan must be
feasible).
•• See In re Continental Airlines, Inc., 134 B.R. 536, 543 (Bankr. D. Del. 1991); In re
Whitemont Assocs., 125 B.R . 354, 357 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1991.). The court in In re 266 Washington
Assocs. explained:
The definition of " effective reorganization" articulated by the Supreme Court in the Timbers case necessarily implicates, to a degree, consideration of the plan confirmation standards of 11 U .S.C. § 1129. Clearly, "effective reorganization" must mean that confirmation of a reorganization plan in the near future is within the realm of possibility. We agree
with the Debtor that the requirements for successful opposition to a lift stay motion under
11 U .S.C. § 362 (d)(2) is not to be equated with sustaining the burden of confirming a
reorganization plan and that a lift stay hea ring should not be transformed into a confirmation hearing. The "effective reorganization" requirement enunciated by the Supreme Court
does, however, require a showing by a debtor and a determination by the bankruptcy court
that a proposed or contemplated plan is not patently unconfirmable and has a realistic
chance of being confirmed.
In re 266 Washington Assocs. , 141 B.R. 275, 281 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y 1992).

230

BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 9

Two. 44
Having determined that the automatic stay obliterates cram down
protection for secured creditors, Baird and Picker next advocate extending
the permanent automatic stay to cases where a going concern surplus does
not exist, so that Creditor will lose its collateral in cases now relegated to
chapter 7:
At some point . . . Manager's alternative wage and the liquidation value of
the assets equals the value of Firm (WM + Ve = VM = [O]). At this
point, there is no going concern surplus, and Creditor will be able to
lift the automatic stay and receive the liquidation value of the assets.
The payoff to Creditor suddenly jumps from its bargained-for share
to the liquidation value of the assets.
It is hard to find a normative justification for this discontinuity.
In a world of uncertainty, the discontinuity introduces a high level of
variance into the payoffs, as a minimal difference in the perceived
liquidation value of the assets may determine whether the stay is
lifted or maintained. As we have shown, the ability to lift the stay ..
. has substantial consequences for the division of Firm between
Creditor and Manager. 0
In other words, in the name of the previously unknown principle of "continuity," Baird and Picker assert that the permanent automatic stay
should apply even where a negative going concern surplus exists. Even in
a chapter 7 case, if the bankruptcy trustees expropriate collateral, their
•• Baird and Picker assure us that "[t]he permanent stay model tracks existing law when Firm
has value as a going concern; the full exit model tracks it when it does not. " Baird & Picker, supra
note 2, at 342. However, very late in their article, Baird and Picker concede that perhaps a nonremovable automatic stay is not realistic. " For example," they write, "a bankruptcy judge's willingness to
lift the automatic stay may turn in some measure on the bargaining position that Manager takes. Her
unwillingness to offer Creditor the liquidation value of the assets may induce the judge to lift the stay
or threaten to lift it." Id . at 348. This proposition is the law of bankruptcy which , if introduced into
Baird and Picker's model , eliminates all distinction between Models One and Two. The automatic
stay would then cohere with cram down, per the ordinary assumptions of bankruptcy scholarship that
Baird and Picker wish to attack.
One of the claims Baird and Picker advance for their model is that it is empirically testable. Id .
at 348 ("(O]ur model . .. predicts that, when Creditor cannot lift the automatic stay and Manager's
exit option is weak, Creditor will receive only its bargained-for share [i.e., less than liquidation
value]. "). But if the automatic stay of their model does not exist, Baird and Picker are immune from
empirical disproof.
•• Baird & Picker, supra note 2, at 342-43. As demonstrated in the appendix, WM is an economically irrational self-imposed pay cut by Manager. In a well-constructed model , WM - 0 because
Manager can pay itself the competitive value of its services to Firm. Hence, Baird and Picker effectively speak about Vc > VM in a chapter 7 liquidation case.
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winter of discontinuity becomes a glorious summer by virtue of the sunny
automatic stay.••
Baird and Picker worry that the discontinuous quality of the automatic stay cannot be justified, but, in fact, this justification is easy. The
whole purpose of chapter 11 is to preserve a going concern surplus which
might be lost in a liquidation sale. Therefore, the automatic stay should
restrain an undersecured creditor when VM > Vc; it should not restrain
an undersecured creditor when VM < Vc. 47 To the contrary, in chapter 7,
the trustee must show that debtor equity exists to justify the stay.0 Because the secured creditor cannot be trusted to maximize this debtor equity, the Bankruptcy Code insists that the trustee have control of the liquidation procedure when debtor equity exists. In both cases, the automatic
stay restrains the secured creditor only when extra value in the collateral
would otherwise be lost to the general creditors.
If the automatic stay can never be removed in either chapter 7 or
chapter 11, as Baird and Picker advocate, and if Creditor must therefore
waive its cram down rights, it might be said that Creditor has no security
interest whatsoever. A secured creditor that can never repossess collateral
and that has no priority to assets vis-a-vis other creditors is precisely identical to a general unsecured creditor. 49 In short, Baird .and Picker advocate
the abolition of security interests in bankruptcy by suggesting that a permanei:it automatic stay be extended from chapter 11 to chapter 7.
This comment illustrates that Baird and Picker described the features
•• The view that the automatic stay should always apply permanently, regardless of whether
Firm has a going concern surplus, leads to bargaining as the only means of dividing the value of
Firm. Yet Baird and Picker opine that bargaining is a bad thing and that Manager should have a low
cash-out option (80% of liquidation value). Su infra note 59. Hence, Baird and Picker are in a state
of contradiction on the morality of bankruptcy bargaining.
47
This proposition is true even when no debtor equity exists in the assets, as Baird and Picker
assume throughou t their article. According to § 362(d)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code, the bankruptcy
court must lift the automatic stay when no debtor equity exists and when the debtor does not need the
assets for an effective reorganization. 11 U .S.C. § 362(d)(2) (1988).
•• 11 U .S.C . § 362(d)(2)(A) (1988).
•• Baird and Picker recognize the validity of this statement. In advocating the benefit of a nonremovable automatic stay, they assert: "[l]t is not obvious to what extent the priority of Creditor should
be recognized. A large part of the value of Firm may result from investments in human capital on the
part of Manager." Baird & Picker, supra note 2, at 348. This anti-market suggestion is remarkable,
coming from University of Chicago law professors. It presupposes that distributions ought to be based
on some natural law notion of desert, rather than on ex ante contract, even with the risk of economic
di slocation resulting from parties reacting strategically to such a proposal. In fact, guaranteeing Manager a return on investment creates the wrong incentives, constituting a form of socialism or protectionism for the entrepreneurial class. Such a view is quite contrary to the official Chicago Law School
dogma.
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of an automatic stay that does not exist. They have failed to understand
the doctrinal materials they wish to explain. Admittedly, this criticism of
law-and-economics scholarship is somewhat simplistic. It may be taken as
axiomatic that, for every economic theory that fails to explains positive
law, another theory succeeds.

C.

Model Three: No Automatic Stay, New Value Exception

In Model Three, Manager can buy newly issued stock for its appraised value. It follows that Manager can force Creditor to take Vc· As
Baird and Picker suggest, "Manager under the new value exception is
also able to force Creditor out of Firm." 110 On the other hand, no automatic stay exists. Hence, Manager cannot prevent Creditor from seizing
Vc· This situation is diagrammed as follows:

Payoffs

Sc

Ve

Figure Three
New Value Exception--No Automatic Stay

In Figure Three, Creditor always gets V c while Manager always gets VM
- V c· For every dollar increase in V c, Manager loses a dollar until Manager approaches zero and V c approaches VM·
Thus, it ought to be apparent that Manager's purchase of newly issued stock for market value does not explain why Manager .can rid Firm
of Creditor by foisting Vc on Creditor. When Firm does issue stock, it
may choose to pay off secured claims with the proceeds received, but noth00

Baird & Picker, supra note 2, at 328.
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ing in the rules requires Firm to do so. 111 In short, Baird and Picker are
guilty of non sequitur, and consequently, all their remarks about Model
Three (and, later, Model Four) must be rejected as founded on bad logic.
If Manager wishes to cash out Creditor, Manager might do so
through cram down. Hence, it is likely that Baird and Picker confounded
the new value exception to the absolute priority rule with cram down
under section 1129(b)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code. 112
Baird and Picker's assumption that Creditor will receive liquidation
value under these cram down provisions demonstrates their ignorance of
the case law. Although one judge advocates this idea,11 8 the vast majority of
the courts in reported cases insist that in a chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding, Creditor should receive going concern value for its collateral. 11"
01
Ste Ralph A. Peeples, Staying In: Chapter 11, Close Corporations and the Absolute Priority
Rule, 63 AM. BANKR. L.J. 65, 96-98 (1989) (concluding that the new value exception provides no

implications for the use of the new value contributed).
02
11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A) (1988). At various points, Baird and Picker hint that the new
value exception is not really useful in getting rid of Creditor because Manager always can award
itself a wage equalling V,w This concession is devastating to Baird and Picker because it means that
Manager never needs to bargain to steal surplus going concern value from Creditor. Ste supra note
33.
•• Judge James Queenan is virtually alone in asserting that a secured creditor might be
crammed down on the basis of liquidation value. See In re Robbins, 119 B.R. 1, 4 (Bankr. D . Mass.
1990) ("Use of collateral by a debtor, even by one who has placed his financial house in order, is a
neutral factor in establishing a standard of valuation ."); In re T.H.B. Corp. , 85 B.R. 192, 196
(Bankr. D . Mass. 1988) ("The fact that the debtor is a going concern is no reason to value the
collateral under the going concern standard unless it appears likely that the secured party will actually receive that value from its collateral through a pending sale.").
•• See, e.g., Am. Universal Ins. Co. v. Dunlap (In re Microwave Prods.), 118 B.R. 566, 574
(Bankr. W .D. Tenn. 1990) (using going concern value in the reorganization); Downey Sav. & Loan
Ass' n v. Helionetics, Inc. (In rt Helionetics, Inc.) , 70 B.R. 433, 439 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1987) (determining that going concern value must be used in chapter 1 I cases, absent unusual circumstances); In
re Frost, 47 B.R. 961, 963-64 (D. Kan. 1985) (concerning going concern value in chapter 13); Bank
Hapoalim B.M . v. E .L.I., Ltd. (In rt Bank Hapoalim B.M.), 42 B.R. 376, 379 (N.D. Ill. 1984)
(determining that liquidation values are for liquidation cases and going concern values are for reorganization cases); Gen. Elec. Credit Corp. v. QPL Components (In re QPL Components), 20 B.R .
342, 345 (Bankr. E.D .N.Y. I 982) (explaining that going concern value is the standard in reorganization cases); LYNN LoPUCKI, STRATEGIES FOR CREDITORS IN BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS 494
(1985) (same); David Gray Carlson, Secured Creditors and the Eely Character of Bankruptcy Valuations, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 63 (1991) (same); Chaim Fortgang & Thomas Moers Mayer, Valuations
in Bankruptcy, 32 UCLA L. REV. 1061, 1087 (1985) (same); Isaac Pachulski, The Cram Down and
Valuation Under Chapter 11 of the Banlcruptcy Code, 58 N.C. L. REV. 925 , 939 (1980) ("It is
incongruous to value a business that is being reorganized on the basis of the price its assets could fetch
on a piecemeal liquidation when the entire theo·ry of the reorganization is that the debtor is being
preserved as a going concern."); see also In re Robinson Ranch , Inc., 75 B.R. 606, 608-09 (Rankr. D .
Mont. I 987) (stating that chapter 12 requires use of "fair market value," not liquidation value); In re
Phoenix Steel Corp., 39 B.R. 218, 226-27 (D. Del. 1984) (explaining that because the court was
unsure whether the debtor-in-possession would liquidate or remain a going concern, it averaged liqui-
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The Bankruptcy Code supports this conclusion by providing: "Such value
shall be determined in light of the .. . proposed disposition or use of such
property . . .. " 1111 Indeed, in their article, Baird and Picker go so far as to
offer the case of In re Pullman Construction Industries 68 as the paradigm upon which they found their model. 57 Yet, buried deep in this
lengthy case is the following remark by Judge Schmetterer: "It is grossly
inequitable and unfairly discriminatory to 'cram down' forced liquidation
values in a case that does not involve a Chapter 11 liquidating plan." 68
Ironically, the very paradigm Baird and Picker choose for their model of
Firm refutes the idea of cram down at liquidation value. Their oversight
provides a telling example of why legal scholars should read the cases that
they cite.
Even if Baird and Picker were to amend Model Three by substituting cram down for the new value exception, they still base Model Three
upon a controversial minority view of the law. Baird and Picker, at the
very least, should have acknowledged this point. 119
dation and going concern values); Bankruptcy Act Revision: Hearings on H.R. 31 and H.R. 32
Befort the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the judiciary, 94th
Cong. 1st & 2d Sess. 495 (1975-1976) (testimony of Patrick Murphy) (same).
As Judge Norton stated in a famous case:
Having declared itself 10 be a fish to be reorganized, it would be inconsistent for the court
now to permit the Debtor lo declare itself a fowl 10 be liquidated for purposes of "cramming down" a lower "appraised" value upon the secured Creditors. Therefore, a liquidation valuation, i.e., foreclosure value, is a procedure totally foreign to this matter and not a
proper standard for valuation.
In rt Pine Gate Assocs., 3 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CCR) 301 , 309 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1977). For another
sportsman's aphorism: "(T]hc debtors cannot eat with the hounds and run with the hares." In rt
Crockett, 3 B.R. 365, 367 (Bankr. N .D . Ill. 1980).
11
11 U .S.C. § 506(a) (1988) .
.. 107 B.R. 909 (Bankr. N .D. Ill. 1989).
17
Baird & Picker, supra note 2, at 314 n.8.
.. 107 B.R. at 939.
" Although few bankruptcy judges would allow a secured creditor to be crammed down at liquidation values, Baird and Picker go further . and suggest cram down at only 80% of liquidation value.
In other words, Baird and Picker advocate that collateral should receive the lowest possible valuation,
and even then, secured creditors should be clipped for another 20% of their collateral:
There arc alternative ways in wl]ich to create a set of exit options that minimize the
extent to which the forces that drive the bargaining process ... determine the division of
Firm between Creditor and Manager when Firm's capital structure must be changed. For
example, a rule might allow Manager to buy Creditor out for 80 percent of the liquidation
value of the assets.
Baird & Picker, supra note 2, at 346. Herc, Baird and Picker assert that bargaining is bad because it
depends on morally contingent factors such as the ability of one side to wait the other out. Id . at 34344. Hence, some sort of nonbargaining call on assets should be given to management, a call that is
20% below the lowest conceivable value of the collateral. This concession amounts to a major wealth
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Another flaw in Baird and Picker's reasoning is their insistence that
because of the new value exception (i.e., cram down), Manager may buy
out Creditor for liquidation value and capture the going concern surplus.
Creditor always receives liquidation value but never anything more. 60
Even if the new value exception, however, did introduce a cash-out option
(which, in fact, comes from cram down), the new value exception does not
allow Manager to capture the going concern value. In Baird and Picker's
example, liquidation value is $3 million and Firm is worth $5 million.
Since Manager always pays fair market value, Manager has to pay a
minimum of $2 million for the common stock. Once paid in, this amount
goes to the general creditors unless they waive their rights. 61 Baird and
Picker assume that general creditors do waive their rights. In support of
this proposition, they cite the fact that Manager is the cause of the going
concern surplus; if general creditors do not consent, Manager walks. 62
However, because Creditor is one of the general creditors, in fact the
dominant general creditor, Creditor must consent to waive cram down
rights. Whereas before Creditor might waive the general creditor rights to
take a premium on the secured claim, now Manager cashes out Creditor's
secured claim at the minimum. Therefore, the conditions for Creditor consent evaporate. Creditor then becomes entitled to the $2 million that Mantransfer from secured creditors to unsecured creditors (or to management).
In comparison, Baird and Picker consider a buyout for more than liquidation value a bad thing
because it would lead to more bargaining:
A rule that allowed Manager to buy out Creditor for an amount that was greater than the
liquidation value would not eliminate the possibility of a division determined by time preferences, but it would reduce its likelihood. Consider, for example, a legal regime in which
Creditor could exercise its default right unless Manager paid it 120 percent of the assets'
liquidation value. Under this rule, the bargained-for share would matter only when its
value fell between the liquidation value of the assets and 120 percent of the liquidation
value of the assets . .. . This is the only range under this legal regime in which both
parties would settle for their bargained-for share.
Id . at 346. Now, if Creditor can obtain $100 by liquidating, Creditor will listen to any offer for
payment of above $100. The $120 limit proposed here would set a blackmail maximum that Creditor
can charge Manager to defer foreclosure.
This suggestion that secured creditors get only 80% of liquidation value is significant because
courts generally do the opposite; they use going concern values in cram down . In essence, Baird and
Picker would deprive secured creditors of their leverage over managers in exchange, as always, for
higher interest rates up front. They are paternalistic in that they do not allow the parties to work out
loan terms for themselves. But see id. at 344 (veering back, without warning, toward pre-bankruptcy
freedom of contract for Creditor and Manager).
00
Baird & Picker, supra note 2, at 344.
•• See Bruce A. Markell , Owners, Auctions, and Absolute Priority in Banltruptcy Reorganizations, 44 STAN . L. REV. 69, 97-98 (1991) .
81
Baird and Picker, supra note 2, at 315, 339.
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ager must pay in, plus the $3 million in liquidation value that Manager
must pay Creditor.
At this point, the power to block confirmation of a plan moves to the
unsecured creditors, which means it moves to the Creditor in the guise of
its unlimited unsecured claim. 83 Yet, if surpluses are always split fiftyfifty, this observation leads to the conclusion that the general creditors get
half and Manager gets half. That is, Model Three fails to prove that the
new value exception (in other words, cram down) moves the going concern surplus from the secured creditors to the equity claimants, but nothing new or distinct has occurred between Model One and Model Three.
Whatever bargaining power Creditor had to extract the rents in Model
One still exists in Model Three. Model One and Model Three should
have reached identical results. Interestingly, Model One and Model Two
would have also reached identical results if Baird and Picker had applied
the Supreme Court's ruling in Timbers. Thus, in spite of a great deal of
sound and fury, Baird and Picker's analysis to this point signifies nothing.
All models are the same.
Baird and Picker also failed to distinguish Model One and Model
Three in that the automatic stay is absent from Model One. Creditor
could simply foreclose under state law over Manager's opposition. Hence,
in Model One, Manager has to kick back value to Creditor when .5VM >
Vc· These kickbacks, however, mysteriously disappear if Vc > .5VM- 64
Model Three does not contain an automatic stay either, although Baird
and Picker added the new value exception (cram down). Why can Creditor still not withdraw assets from the bankruptcy court and hold a state
law foreclosure sale? If no automatic stay exists, nothing in the new value
exception or cram down prevents Creditor from withdrawing assets from
the reach of the bankruptcy court.
Cram down, in fact, depends on the automatic stay. If Creditor need
not stick around the bankruptcy court because the court did not impose an
automatic stay, then Creditor need not be crammed down. As in Model
One, Creditor is in a position to insist on . 5VM as the price of not foreclosing on Firm. Baird and Picker's assumption that cram down exists in
Model Three results from their confusion. In fact, Model One and Model
Three are identical. So far, the new value exception is without effect on
•• The Supreme Court specifically ruled that an undersecured creditor may vote the unsecured
deficit in aid of the secured claim, even though secured and unsecured creditors have adverse interests
in a chapter 11 proceeding. See Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U .S. 197, 200-03 (1988).
•• For a criticism of the disappearance of hold-up power, see appendix.
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bankruptcy bargaining.

D . Model Four: Automatic Stay, New Value Exception

According to Baird and Picker, Model Four is the most important of
the models because it supposedly replicates the current legal regime. 611 In
fact, it is the model that least resembles the current law .66
In Model Four, Baird and Picker add the automatic stay back into
the equation, along with the new value exception (cram down at liquidation value). 67 As in Model Two, Baird and Picker assume that the automatic stay eliminates Creditor's security interest. 68 Creditor's cram down
rights are meaningless because Manager can simply refuse to proceed and
can keep the bankruptcy going as long as is necessary to persuade Creditor to give in and consent to the plan. In Model Two, this means that
Creditor always gets .5VM ·
Model Four differs from Model Two only in that cram down , after
having died in Model Two, like Lazarus, is back. 69 Manager may now
cram down Creditor at less than . 5VM whenever Vc < .5VM· Otherwise,
where Vc is too high, Manager simply gives . 5VM to Creditor. In Model
Three, this upward limit on Creditor of . 5VM was unavailable to Manager because the automatic stay did not exist to prevent Creditor from
foreclosing.
•• Baird & Pi cker, supra note 2, at 345 ("[I]t represents the bargaining that would exist under
current law if the new value exception docs continue under the Bankruptcy Code.") (footnote
omiued ).

•• See discussion infra notes 70-7 4 and accompanying text.
67
Baird & Picker , supra note 2, at 345.
•• See text accompanying note 49.
•• For those unfamiliar with biblical lore:
Jesus said, " Take ye away the stone." Martha , the sister of him that was dead, saith unto
him , " Lord, by this time he stinketh: for he hath been dead four days." Jesus saith unto
her , Said I Not unto thee, that , if thou wouldest believe, thou shouldest see the glory of
God'" Then they took away the stone from the place where the dead was laid . . . And
when he thus had spoken, he cried with a loud voice, " Lazarus, come forth. "
And he that was dead came forth, bound hand and foot with graveclothes: and hi s face
was bound about with a napkin.
j ohn 11 :39-44.
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Figure Four
Automatic Stay, New Value Exception

As demonstrated above, Baird and Picker confounded the new value
exception with an eccentric view of cf'am down. According to Baird and
Picker, a bankruptcy court, contrary to the great weight of authority, will
force Creditor to take liquidation value. This assumption failed to rehabilitate Model Three because cram down requires the imposition of the automatic stay to keep the assets in front of the bankruptcy court. Now, with
the automatic stay in place, cram down is slightly more apropos, but the
other objections previously presented still apply. In other words, nothing
about cram down proves that VM - V c moves to Manager rather than to
the general creditors. Since Creditor is the largest general creditor, and
since a cashed-out Creditor has no further reason to consent to give up its
general creditor rights, cram down does not explain how Manager can
acquire the going concern surplus.

IV.

WHICH MODEL MOST ADEQUATELY REPRESENTS REALITY?

Of the four models presented by Baird and Picker, which most adequately represents the current legal regime? Baird and Picker believe that
Model Four, which includes the permanent automatic stay and the new
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value exception, is the most representative. 70 In fact, only Model One
bears even a faint resemblance to the current legal regime.
In Model One, Creditor could exit, guaranteeing it a mm1mum of
Ve- But Creditor might obtain more - .5VM when .5VM > Ve - because Manager needs Creditor's consent to confirm a plan. This partly
coheres with the case law, which shows that Creditor always receives a
share of going concern value from Creditor's collateral in cram down. If
Manager withholds all the going concern value, Creditor can obtain relief
of the automatic stay. Now, Timber~ indicates that, for the first few
months, courts should be lenient toward Manager in order to give Manager breathing space to devise a confirmable plan. 71 But such a grace period is surely dependent on Manager's intent to honor Creditor's cram
down rights. Manager's refusal to offer cram down rights constitutes per
se grounds to have the stay lifted immediately. 72 Indeed, as Model One is
a perfect information model, the bankruptcy judge already knows about
this outrage and will already have lifted the automatic stay sua sponte. As
Creditor in turn already knows what the bankruptcy judge has done,
Creditor can foreclose under state law immediately. Hence, the current
legal regime is one in which there is no permanent automatic stay. Or, if
Manager renounces cram down in advance under conditions of perfect
information, the automatic stay is perfectly nonexistent.
Model Two does not represent reality because it assumes that the
automatic stay lasts until Creditor waives its cram down rights. This is
tantamount to stipulating that security interests do not exist. Yet, bankruptcy courts, practitioners, and scholars universally believe that to the
extent that prepetition creditors get anything out of bankruptcy, they get
it from their security interests, which entitle these creditors to cram down
rights. 73
Model Three also does not represent reality because it represents
Manager stealing VM - Vc by cramming down Creditor at Vc· Yet, with
no automatic stay, the Bankruptcy Code provides no mechanism to cram
down Creditor. The premise of Model Three is that Creditor can withdraw the assets at will from the bankruptcy proceeding. A forced cash-out
and theft of the going concern value depends on the automatic stay. Fur70

Id. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
United Savings Associatiori of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 108 S. Ct. 626,
632-33 (1988).
71
11 U .S.C. §§ 362(d)(2)(B) (I 988 & Supp. III 1991).
73
James W. Bowers, ·croping and Coping in the Shadows of Murphy's Law: Banlcruptcy Theory and the Elementary Economics of Failure , 88 MICH . L. REV . 2097, 2013 (1990).
71
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thermore, the model confounds the new value exception with cram down.
The new value exception is completely irrelevant to this analysis.
Finally, Baird and Picker falsely presume that Model Four closely
resembles reality. In this model, Manager can cash out Creditor for a low
liquidation value or give Creditor one-half of Firm, whichever is cheaper.
Few courts, however, have been willing to award going concern value to
Manager by limiting Creditor to liquidation value in cram down. Instead,
courts overwhelmingly award going concern value to secured creditors. 74
In short, the latter three models do not resemble the existing bankruptcy regime. Hence, Baird and Picker failed to show that the automatic
stay destroys cram down or that the new value exception allows cram
down at liquidation values.
V.

CONCLUSION

The game theory model of Baird and Picker is a rich congregation of
absurdities that does not have a healthy influence on chapter 11 policy.
Nevertheless, game theory is a progressive advance for the law and. economics movement. When law professors declaim the efficiency of law,
they imply for themselves a Faustian command of each and every cost and
benefit a law engenders.711 The plausibility of such claims is that efficiency
proclamations should be ignored. 76
Game theory does not make these conceited claims. Instead, game
theory modestly speaks about the maximizing strategies of individuals
given the strategies of others without any implied normative claim of social good. 77 This normative modesty serves as a welcome antidote to the
74
70

See supra note 54.
See David Gray Carlson, Banhruptcy Thtory and tht Creditors Bargain, __ U. CIN. L.

(forthcoming 1993) (developing the general theory of the second best).
Ian Ayres concludes that game theory attacks the idea that markets maximize utility , and ,
therefore, such theory is at war with the laissez-faire policy prescriptions of the Chicago School of
Law and Economics. Ian Ayres, Playing Gamts with tht Law, 42 STAN. L. REV . 1291, 1315-17
(1990). In other words, game theory shows that competitors end up at Nash equilibrium, see infra
note 81 and accompanying text, with no incentive to reach Pareto optimality. This result , in turn ,
indicts markets and justifies government intervention into markets to produce social welfare.
77
Unfortunately, Baird and Picker do not comprehend this modesty of game theory. They continue to make the usual artificial welfare claims for their thesis. One of their regrettable comments
states:
If [lawyers' fees] can be reduced and the rights of all the relevant parties can still be
protected, we should want to do so. We want to ensure that the renegotiations that take
place either in Chapter 11 or the shadow of Chapter 11 cost as little as possible.
Baird & Picker, supra note 2, at 316. This statement fails to take account of second-best effects and
also fails to relate bankruptcy costs to the marginal cost of production. Without this latter relation ,
REV.

78
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hypocrisies usually issued in the name of welfare economics.
APPENDIX

The purpose of this comment is to show that two fundamental errors,
a legal mistake and a logical non sequitur, invalidate Baird and Picker's
finding that cram down does not exist and that the new value exception
allows undersecured creditors to be cashed out at low liquidation values.
This appendix presents a series of technical criticisms of the Baird and
Picker model.
A.

Manager's Talent

Baird and Picker assume that Manager's talent causes VM · 78 This
assumption implies market imperfection. In a perfect market, if management skill produces VM• then Firm's competition can replicate this skill
with other resources outside Firm. If so, VM = 0 because going concern
value always equals Manager's opportunity cost. As a result, Manager
does not need to bargain with Creditor to extract any amount over Vc·
It follows that Manager's talent alone cannot account for VM > 0.
Two possible rehabilitative moves explain VM > 0. First, strategic positioning of assets or goodwill with customers could induce positive VM· If
so, then Creditor and Manager jointly control VM and together must
threaten the other general creditors into waiving the absolute priority rule.
Second, positive VM may exist because the market suffers from informational dysfunction. That is, the market for Manager's labor does not
know of Manager's ability to garner a supercompetitive profit. 79 Either
one of these adjustments accounts for a positive VM for Creditor and Manager to split. Each also explains why one party has a veto over the other's
paying lawyers in lieu of creditors is simply a distributional concern. One cannot assume lightly that
marginal changes in the cost of bankruptcy will affect the price of credit.
Similarly regrettable is the statement: "If there are social costs associated with default - and
there almost surely arc - giving a smaller share of Firm to Creditor in the event of a reorganization
may cause welfare losses." Id. at 317. This statement fails to specify whether bankruptcy distributions
affect the price of credit and, therefore, the marginal cost of production, and it ignores the important
welfare benefits that might accrue if interest rates rise - the reduction of costs that limited liability
firms export to the public. See David Gray Carlson, Postpetition Interest Under the Banlcruptcy
Code, 43 U . Miami L. Rev. 577, 617 (I 989). In short, Baird and Picker follow the old line that the
only good transaction cost is a dead transaction cost, and low interest rates are always better than
higher interest rates - propositions that no economist could agree with .
71
Baird & Picker, supra note 2, at 315, 349.
10
Id . at 347 ("[W]e have assumed that everyone has equal knowledge of such things as the
going-concern value of the firm ." ).
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extraction of VM· 10
B.

Equal Patience and the Split of VM

Baird and Picker assume that unless the opportunity to exit exceeds
.5VM , Creditor and Manager will always agree to a fifty-fifty split of
VM. 81 The parties will split VM evenly because of their "equal patience"
to play the bargaining game. 83 More precisely, Baird and Picker assume
that Manager and Creditor have equal rates of return with regard to foregone opportunities. 83
Given their desire to keep game theory rudimentary, Baird and
Picker's assumption that Creditor and Manager will split a surplus evenly
is reasonable. Economists traditionally presuppose such divisions in bilateral monopoly situations where a consumer surplus is to be split amongst
•• In a market with perfect information, M anager could recapture VM simply by letting Creditor
foreclose and by bidding V C + n, assuring the recapture of Firm. Since everyone knows about V M' it
should be easy to get financing at Vc + rVC < VM ( where r is the available interest rate) . Hence,
Manager never needs to share VM with Creditor. Indeed, Baird and Picker write, " we have assumed
that everyone has equal knowledge of such things as the going-concern value of the firm ." Id . Obviously, Manager's ability to create VM is not universally known.
•• Id. at 341.
.. Id . at 339 .
.. Id. Actually, in an alternative bargaining game, equal discount rates produce a split of VM
that merely approaches fifty-fifty, and even then only when the time between Player I's first offer to
Player II and Player II 's counteroffer is infinitely small. Otherwise, equal discount rates do not produce an equal division of VM · The formula that Ariel Rubinstein derives to describe the division of
VM, where Manager makes the first offer, is:

•5c
ocoM

11-

See Ariel Rubinstein , Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model, 50 EcoNOMETRICA 50 (1982)
[hereinafter Rubinstein]. In the above formulation, o is a discount factor , which is related to a discount
rate as follows:

+

r

where r is the interest rate a player could earn by investing today . RASMUSEN , supra note 1, at 89. If
one year passes and the parties have an equal 10% discount rate, the Manager in Rubinstein's
formula receives I I ( I + o) of VM' or 52.38095%. This is not an equal split of V,w
On the other hand, as r approaches zero, o approaches 1. In Rubinstein's formula, De approaches
1 at twice the rate of oJM where lie = OM. Hence, in the limiting case, where o I) I (i.e. , r I) 0), I /(I
+ o) approaches .5. For example, if r = .00001 , Manager's share is 50.00025%.
Hence, equal discount rates plus infinitely small amounts of time between offers arc necessary
for Manager's share merely to approach 50% of V M · See John Sutton, Non-Cooperative Bargain
TMory: An Introduction, 53 REV . EcoN. STUD. 709, 711 (1986); Rubinstein , supra , at 108.
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those who control it. 84 Describing this equal split solely as a function of
equal rates of return on any investment, no matter how large or small the
investment, however, proves quite problematic.
To illustrate the problem, let us examine a different model of how
VM might be split between two parties (C and M). In this model, each
party either agrees to split VM now or waits until the other "sweetens the
offer." Whether these bilateral monopolists will settle now or later is a
function of three variables: what each party could receive now (x), what
each party expects to earn later (y), and each party's rate of return necessary to reduce future expectations to present value (z) .
Variable x, what each party could receive now, might originate from
one of two sources. First, x might originate from a legal rule that sets a
minimum that each party must receive. For example, if Creditor can foreclose on Firm and receive liquidation value <Ve), then Xe = Ve. Alternatively, variable x might originate from a previous offer made by the other
party. In Baird and ' Picker's model, when a permanent automatic stay
prohibits Ve, Xe = .5VM· The Manager always offers . 5VM ·
Whether the parties divide VM now or wait for a better offer later
involves a discount of the future expectation (the y variable) to present
value. Each side can easily compare the present values and decide whether
now is better than later.
'
For example, suppose C and M must split $1 million. No legal rule
defines their entitlements to the $1 million. C and M must work it out for
themselves. Each has a rate of return of 10% on any investment. They are
"equally patient'' in Baird and Picker's assumption.
In the initial negotiation, C offers M $400,000 (x), and M offers C
$400,000 (x). Each party proposes to keep the balance not offered to the
other. The x offers are givens; no economic theory explains their derivation . The y values are also noneconomic givens. Suppose, for example,
that C believes that if C waits one year, M will offer $550,000. Given that
the present value of $550,000 is more than C could earn by taking M's
present offer of $400,000 and investing it for one year, C will wait. Likewise, suppose M thinks that in one year C will give up entirely and offer
•• Su GEORGE STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 216 (4th ed. 1987) (describing the split as
"determined by factors outside the traditional theory: skill in negotiation; public opinion; coin flipping; a wise marriage"); John F. Nash , Jr., The Bargaining Problem, 18 ECONOMETRICA 155
(I 950) ("In general terms, we idealize the bargaining problem by assuming that the two individuals
are highly rational, that each can accurately compare his desires for various things, that they arc
equal in bargaining skill, and that each has full knowledge of the tastes and preferences of the
other.") [hereinafter Nash I).
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M $600,000. Since M can earn more by waiting than by investing today's
offer, M will also wait. Indeed, the waiting would continue indefinitely
until either the expectations or rates of return changed. 811 Only if C or M
expects the cost of waiting to exceed the benefits of waiting will the parties strike a bargain. These three variables, today's offer (x), tomorrow's
expectation (y), and the applicable rate of return (z), represent the knowledge necessary to model bargaining over a surplus.
Baird and Picker, however, view bargaining as a function of only one
variable, the rate of return. They claim that when Creditor's rate of return (oc)'' and Manager's rate of return (oM) are equal, they must divide
VM equally. However, as previously shown, equal rates of return are
neither necessary nor sufficient for an equal split of .5VM· The parties
could reach an equal split even if Oc = /= oM, provided that they manipulate their initial offers or later expectations. On the contrary, the parties
could reach an unequal split if their discount rates are identical, provided
their expectations diverge.
Baird and Picker are able to obtain_support for their assumption of
equal patience from Ariel Rubinstein's alternating offers game. 87 According to this game, Creditor and Manager have an indeterminate share of a
surplus, which they must agree to divide. They also have perfect information about each other, including what each other is thinking.
According to this model, suppose Creditor and Manager disagree on
how much each side should receive. Nevertheless, they agree that if a deal
is made, Manager's share could be described as the indeterminate variable
x, while Creditor's share will be ( I - x). Each side also knows that each
has an equal discount rate r, and hence an equal discount factor which
is:

o,

I
I

+

r

81 Game theorists call this a Nash equilibrium. BRIAN SKYRMS, THE DYNAMICS OF RATIONAL
DELIBERATION 13 (1990) ("A simultaneous choice of acts by all players is called a Nash equilibrium
if no player can improve his or her payoff by a unilateral defection to a different act."); Rasmuscn,
supra note I, at 33.

" In Baird and Picker's model, 6 stands for a rate of return . Baird & Picker, supra note 2, at
334. In game theory, 6 often stands for I I ( I + r), where r is the rate of return. See RASMUSEN,
supra note I , at 89. Baird and Picker give _one example, however, where the " discount rate" appears
to be a "discount factor" instead. Baird & Picker, supra note 2, at 343.

•• See Rubinstein, supra note 75.
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Suppose that Manager offers Credit ( 1 - x) and proposes to keep x, and
Creditor accepts this offer. It is possible for Creditor to anticipate this
action by offering Manager the discounted value of x one round earlier.
Hence, Creditor can bring the deal forward in time b-y: offering ox one
round earlier and keeping the balance of (J - ox). Manager, however, can
also bring the deal forward one round earlier. Since Creditor can obtain
(1 - ox), and Creditor is indifferent between that amount and o(1 - ox)
one round earlier, Manager can get an earlier deal by offering Creditor
o(1 - ox) and retaining the balance of 1 - o(1 - ox). This hypothetical
establishes the beginning of an endless chain of indifference. It is enough,
however, to observe that Manager is indifferent between x in the last
round and 1 - o(1 - ox) two rounds earlier. Hence:

x = 1 - o(1 - ox)

+

X
X

o(l - OX) = J

+

0 - 02 X = 1

+ o=

1

x(l - 02) = 1 -

o

x(l - 01)

X

X

-

-

o = JI (1 + r):

+ o)
(1 + o)

1- o (1
2
)

(1 - 0

1 - 02
( 1 - 01) (1

xSince

o

1-

x-

x=

+

0)

1
1

+

o

1

+
+

r

2

r

This last expression clearly illustrates that, as r -> 0, o -> 1 and x
-> 0.5. That is, under conditions of perfect knowledge, and when alternating offers are infinitely close together (so that r -> 0) , Manager's
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share approaches half, and Creditor's share approaches half. 88 What this
example implies, surprisingly, is that, under the conditions specified, any
preconceived notion of an entitlement to a surplus is irrational. Equality
of discount rates turns back upon preconceived entitlements and destroys
them by showing them to be irrational. 88
Therefore, i.n a very rarified way, Baird and Picker can say that an
equal split of a surplus is a function of equal patience, defined as equal
interest rates. But they also could have simply spitulated that all surpluses
are to be split fifty-fifty.
C.

No Equal Patience When Vc >. 5VM

In Model One, Manager and Creditor split VM fifty-fifty, but this
division evaporates when Vc > .5VM. 9 ° For example, suppose VM = $1
million and Vc = $200,000. Here, Creditor takes .5VM· Now suppose
Vc is $600,000. In this case, Creditor takes Vc· Yet a joint surplus remains of VM - Ve = $400,000. According to Baird and Picker, however,
Creditor cannot extract any part of VM - Vc·
This result is particularly surprising because Baird and Picker explicitly recognize early in their article that Creditor must capture these
benefits:
·
A view of bankruptcy law that advocates tracking nonbankruptcy rules
seems incomplete if it equates Creditor's "nonbankruptcy entitlements"
with the liquidation value of the assets and does not take into account the
benefits Creditor can capture by reaching a bargain with Manager. The
liquidation value of the assets and the value of Manager's alternative wage
merely set the stage for the negotiation between the parties. To the extent
that one adopts the view that bankruptcy should mimic the outcomes that
would exist if no bankruptcy law existed, one would have to worry about
the negotiations that would take place if bankruptcy were not in the picture, not simply about the amount that Creditor would realize if it exercised its right to seize the collateral or that Manager would earn if she
worked elsewhere.91
88

See generally Rasmusen, supra note 1, at 234-35.
•• There is something deeply spiritual about this model. It seems to imply that the concept of
property or of difference disappears when people have precisely the same preference for present versus
future consumption-surely a valuable speculative insight.
00
Baird & Picker, supra note 2, at 338 (" A central feature of this model is that the exit options
do not themselves affect the size of the bargained-for share.").
•• Id . at 3 I 9-20 (footnotes omitted).
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If Baird and Picker followed their own advice, they would have to give
Creditor Vc + .5[VM - Vcl anytime Vc > .5VM and no automatic stay
existed to restrain foreclosure.
Baird and Picker even cite the great Nash as advocating this
approach:
(W]e should note that the strategic approach we adopt in our article is substantially different from another well-known in bargaining: the axiomatic
approach. As originated by John Nash , the axiomatic approach identifies
certain minimal conditions that a solution should satisfy and then characterizes the outcomes that satisfy the conditions ... Nash was able to find .. .
that the parties each get what they would get if no agreement were reached,
plus half of the extra value available ... .93

In other words, Nash would have Creditor receive Vc + .5[VM
when Vc > .5VM and no automatic stay exists.98
Baird and Picker reject the "axiomatic approach" of Nash:

-

Vcl

[T]he disagreement point - the payoffs to the parties in the event no
agreement is reached - is simply taken as a given. Moreover, under the
axiomatic approach , no account is taken of the ability of one party to call
off bargaining unilaterally and exercise an exit option. Hence, the axiomatic approach offers no easy way to understand bankruptcy rules, such as
the automatic stay, whose principal effect is to deny one party the ability to
leave the bargaining. 94

Baird and Picker's objections to Nash's approach are not persuasive. First,
the disagreement points of Nash may be "givens," but what are the exit
options in the Baird and Picker model except givens? Second, nothing in
the axiomatic approach of Nash prevents modelling for the exercise of an
.. Id. at 332 (footnote omitted).
•• Baird and Picker fail in their attempt to cite an article by John F. Nash , Jr. as support for
the proposition quoted in the text. The article by Nash , however, simply demonstrates how to graph
a unique solution to a bargaining output, with the utilities of each of the pl ayers mapped on the
abscissa and ordinate. The article does suggest that when the two players are of equal bargaining
power and utilities, the solution to bargaining lies on a line that is a 45 ° angle from the origin. See
Nash I, supra note 84, at 160. See also John F. Nash , Jr., Two-Person Cooperative Games, 21
E CONOMETRICA 128 (1953) [hereinafter Nash II]. This latter article contrasts two approaches toward
finding unique solutions to bargaining games. It deals with "threats" if the parties fail to reach a
bargain, but it does not mention the situation in which both parties have a preexisting claim to part of
the surplus to be divided. Id. Therefore, the latter article also provides scant support for the statement
by Baird and Picker quoted in the text.
.. Baird & Picker, supra note 2, at 332.
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exit option. 911 Nash himself simply characterizes the "axiomatic approach"
as an alternative way to reach the same result as a noncooperative bargaining analysis."
Another justification for limiting Creditor to Vc when Vc > .5VM is
that, after this point,
lengthy bargaining is relatively unattractive for Creditor, and it can do no
better than demand the value of its exit option, the liquidation value of the
collateral. Such a case arises when, for example, the liquidation value of the
assets is $3 million, the Manager's alternative wage is $1 million, and Firm
is worth $5 million as a going concern with Manager in place. In this case,
Creditor receives $3 million, and Manager captures all the going-concern
surplus. Manager has less to lose by bargaining than Creditor. The exit
option does not strengthen Creditor's hand in bargaining beyond the floor it
sets on what Creditor must receive. When liquidation value exceeds the

" For example, Nash writes:
The threat concept is really basic in the basic theory developed here .... If one considers
the process of making a threat, one secs that its clements arc as follows: A threatens B by
convincing B that if B docs not act in compliance with A's demands, then A will follow a
certain policy T .
·
Nash II, supra note 93, at 130. Nash supplies no reason why he docs not include the option of
quitting the bargaining table and exercising a right against VM within the definition of T. One trio of
analysts think that Nash was vague in defining the disagreement point and suggest that it is no more
than the status quo, absent an agreement. Ken Binmore et al. , The Nash Bargaining Solution in
Economic Modelling, 17 RAND. J. EcoN. 176, 176-78 (1986).
Baird and Picker assure us that " [i]t is important to note that what we have defined as exit
options are not the same as disagreement points in the Nash demand game." Baird & Picker, supra
note 2, at 332 n.48. For this proposition they cite MARTIN J. OSBORNE & ARIEL RUBINSTEIN,
BARGAINING & MARKETS 88 (1982), which neglects to elucidate this distinction. To the contrary, it
would appear that the exit options are nothing other than status quo absent agreement.
" Nash describes two different approaches to solving a cooperative bargaining game, in which
the parties are allowed to confer with each other in reaching the optimal solution: the "negotiation"
approach and the "axiomatic" approach:
In the first, the cooperative game is reduced to a non-cooperative game. To do this, one
makes the players' steps of negotiation in the cooperative game become moves in the noncooperative model. Of course, one cannot represent all possible bargaining devices as moves
in the non-cooperative game. The negotiation process must be formalized and restricted,
but in such a way that each participant is still able to utilize all the essential strengths of
his position.
The second approach is by the axiomatic method. One states as axioms several
properties that it would seem natural for the solution to have and then one discovers that
the axioms actually determine the solution uniquely. The two approaches to the problem
. . . arc complementary; each helps to justify and clarify the other.
Nash II, supra note 93, at 129.
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value of its bargained-for share, Creditor cannot receive more than the liquidation value.97

In this instance, Creditor is equally patient with Manager, or as Baird
and Picker define it, oe = oM, but the opportunity costs for waiting differ
($3 million versus $1 million). It does not necessarily follow, however,
that Creditor has no bargaining power by which to get something beyond
Ve because Creditor retains a powerful threat, liquidation of the company, as there is no automatic stay at this point to prevent such action.
Under state law, Manager can redeem Firm only by paying the full
amount of Creditor's claim or by offering some compromise with Creditor
whereby Creditor obtains Ve plus a portion of VM • Ve· Because Creditor
can deprive Manager of economic rents (VM • Ve), Manager might pay
Creditor to commence liquidation, pending a better offer than the meager
Ve that Manager previously offered. 98
Indeed, Baird and Picker imply that when Creditor's exit option is
"weak,"" Creditor gets more than Ve. But when Creditor possesses a
"strong" exit option, Creditor receives no bonus. Hence, in weakness
there is strength, according to Baird and Picker.
Another justification for the evaporation of Creditor's bargaining
power when Ve > .5VM is the requirement of "subgame perfectness." 100
Game theory sometimes employs this assumption to reduce the multiple
Nash equilibrium a game would otherwise imply. 101 One effect of subgame perfection is that Creditor cannot threaten a move that will hurt
both Creditor and Manager in the hope that Manager will increase the
offer later to avoid a loss. 101 Relying on this assumption, Manager knows
that Creditor will never foreclose if Manager offers Creditor Ve· When a
., Baird & Picker, supra note 2, at 341.
N Late in their article, Baird & Picker give an example that undermines the assumption that
Creditor only gets Vc when V c > .5VM " In this example, the players have identical capital stakes
but different discount factors . This causes a different split of VM " Baird & Picker, supra note 2, at
343. If a comparatively impatient player obtains part of VM when 6c =I= 6M' then it should also
guarantee Creditor part of VM when 6c - 6M. However, Creditor is more impatient because VC >
. 5VM· In both cases, unequal impatience should have the same result as that of a split that is something other than fifty-fifty .
" " We call an exit option 'weak' if it gives a party less than that party's bargained-for share."
Baird & Picker, supra note 2, at 338.
100
Id. at 330.
101
Set RASMUSEN, supra note 1, at 85. Rasmuscn defines the concept as follows: "A strategy
combination is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium if (a) it is a Nash equilibrium for the entire
game; and (b) its relevant action rules arc a Nash equilibrium for every subgamc." Id.
181
Baird & Picker, supra note 2, at 330.

250

BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 9

creditor is undersecured and the debtor is insolvent, payment now must
always exceed payment later. Any threat in this regard can be ignored
because Creditor must only compare the optimal move in the subgame at
hand, where Creditor decides whether it prefers V c now or Vc later.
Subgame perfectness is, of course, just an assumption. This assumption appears, however, to be ill-suited for the Baird and Picker model. For
one thing, subgame perfectness is a strategy one can adopt if one's game
produces too many unattractive Nash equilibrium.101 Yet in the Baird and
Picker model, where Creditor and Manager face each other with strongly
dominant strategies, 104 there is only one Nash equilibrium and hence no
reason for subgame perfectness. Second, subgame perfectness allows for
easy manipulation by Manager's simply asserting that Creditor makes the
first move. 1011 Suppose Creditor says: "Unless you give me Vc + x, I will
repossess the assets." If VM - Vc > x, Manager must accept Creditor's
offer. In short, subgame perfectness simply assures that whoever makes
the first move has the advantage over the opponent. The Baird and Picker
adoption of subgame perfectness is not so much a justification of Creditor's loss of bargaining power as an ipse dixit.
Even if subgame perfectness explains why Creditor does not hold out
for anything above Vc, it also implies that Creditor gets V c all the time,
even when V c < .SV M , because Manager's optimal strategy is always to
offer Vc and no more. However, Baird and Picker fail to explain why
Manager need ever offer more than Vc· Indeed, subgame perfectness only
serves to emphasize how artificial it is to assume that Creditor has power
to extract rents when Vc < .5VM• but not when Vc > .5VM·
In truth, there seems to be no good reason why Creditor should lose
all ability to extract VM - Vc if Vc > .5VM• except perhaps that Model
One, as Baird and Picker have drawn it, is the mirror image of Model
Four. If Model One were drawn to guarantee Creditor Ve + .5fVM Vcl, Baird and Picker would have sacrificed symmetry. Elegance, therefore, demands this peculiar assumption. Yet is there a poorer reason to
infuse assumptions into a model than the production of elegance?
D.

Manager's Opportunity Cost

The above discussion suggests that each side needs a here-and-now
against which to compare the benefits of waiting. This here-and-now
10

1

•

°'

10
•

RASMUSEN, supra note I, at 100 n.42.
That is, Manager always offers and never exits. Creditor always accepts and never rejects.
RASMUSEN , supra note I, at 87-88.
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might come from a mm1mum share that the law requires, for example,
Creditor's Vc, where Creditor has a right to foreclose on Firm, or from an
offer to split VM·
Manager's opportunity cost is the extra wages that it could earn in
another market. In Baird and Picker's model, Manager is already earning
a wage from Firm. 106 VM is the surplus after Manager receives this wage.
Yet, quite unnecessarily, Manager pays itself a below-market wage. 107 As
a result, Manager must always extract WM from VM· WM is the difference
between Manager's actual and potential wage.108 Baird and Picker should
. simplify their model if Manager receives precisely the market wage before
VM is split. In this model, WM = 0. Manager then has no minimum with
regard to the split and no incentive to walk away from Firm.109
Indeed, if WM
0, Manager effectively contributes WM to increase
the size of VM· Since, in three of the four models, Creditor gets .5VM at
least part of the time, this contribution is purely altruistic on the part of
Manager. Hence, WM > 0 attributes economic irrationality to Manager,
a feature game theory cannot abide. 110

>

ioe
101

108

Baird & Picker, supra note 2, at 320 n.23 .

Id.
Id. at 323-24.

WM = 0 would also have saved Baird and Picker from an analytical error when they alleged
that Manager's submarket wage from Firm pressured Manager to make a quick deal with Creditor.
Id. at 320 ("By contrast ... Manager loses the benefit of a higher wage") (footnote omitted). In fact,
Manager is in charge of Manager's own salary and can easily avoid this pernicious pressure by
awarding itself a raise.
Can Manager also simply pay itself VM and deem this payment wages? Baird and Picker imply
so, in which case bargaining with Creditor over VM is always unnecessary - an embarrassment that
negates most of their modelling. See supra note 33.
110
Baird and Picker explain Manager's subcompetitive wage differently from pure altruism.
They write:
Manager is still paid a cash wage from Firm after the filing of the bankruptcy petition, but
this wage is not as large as what she could make elsewhere.' The cash wage is low because
of her (now nearly worthless) equity stake and the psychic benefits from running her own
shop.
Baird & Picker, supra note 2, at 320 n.23. Neither of these reasons is convincing. First, the equity
stake is not worthless. Rather, it is worth . 5VM or perhaps VM • Vc• depending on the circumstances.
Unless Ve I) VM' Manager's equity stake is quite valuable. Furthermore, psychic benefits cannot
explain the low wage because Manager has no constraint in naming its own salary. Because Manager
is its own boss, Manager enjoys both the psychic benefits and the competitive wage, if so desired.
Establishing WM is, in fact, part of the game itself, since it is a voluntary move by Manager. If
Baird and Picker were to acknowledge this fact, then WM > 0 also makes the subgame imperfect , in
violation of Baird an~ Picker's assumptions. Baird & Picker, supra note 2, at 330. That is, the first
subgame is: "Manager increases VM by taking fewer wages, thereby enriching Creditor," or " Manager decreases VM by taking more wages, thereby enriching Manager." Subgame perfectness surely
requires the latter move, and yet Baird and Picker have Manager making the former move.
10
•
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Baird and Picker define the equal patience of Creditor and Manager
as a function only of rate of return. 111 Hence, Baird and Picker advocate
that Manager, with no real opportunity cost, is equally as patient as
Creditor who, in some of the models, feels entitled to the liquidation value
of the assets.
Yet, if Manager and Creditor are equally patient, and if they have
equal rates of return, then they must have equal capital stakes, for example, opportunities foregone, as well. That is, the parties are equally patient only when the cost of waiting is equal, but equal costs means equal
lost income - a function of both interest rates and opportunity costs. 111
Given that Creditor's opportunity cost is precisely what Creditor expects to extract from VM• then equal patience (oc = oM) demands that
Manager have an equal opportunity cost. In other words, Ve = WM. Yet
WM = 0, unless Manager is altruistic. Therefore, whenever Manager is
self-interested, liquidation value falls to zero. When Manager altruistically takes a pay cut to enrich Creditor, liquidation value of the assets
rises. This proposition is ridiculous. The distress market for liquidated
assets does not rise and fall as Manager veers between impulses of selfishness and generosity. This market is strictly indifferent to the psychological
characteristics of the ex-Manager.
These hidden assumptions also commit Baird and Picker to the view
111

Id. at 339.
In one instance, Baird and Picker present a model in which the parties have equal capital
stakes. Baird & Picker, supra note 2, at 343 ("Assume Firm is worth SS million. Manager has an
alternative wage of St million, and Creditor can liquidate the assets for St million."). But in another
part of their article, Baird and Picker present a model where the capital stakes arc maximally diverse:
We should note that our model makes what might seem a counter-intuitive prediction.
Let the going concern value of Firm be SS million, and consider the limiting case of a net
alternative wage of St and a liquidation value of S2,499,999. If Creditor and Manager
have the same discount rate, they will split Firm evenly in the full exit model. To understand this prediction, one must recognize that in this case Creditor's threat to leave the
bargaining is no more credible than Manager's. Both exit options arc weak and hence do
not affect the outcome of the bargaining.
Id . at 341. This prediction is based on non sequitur. The split is supposed to be based on equal
patience, yet no waiting occun in this last example. The parties either exit or split VM fifty-fifty. If
the parties neither exit nor agree to a fifty-fifty split, they do not have identical costs of waiting for a
better bargain later. Creditor has an opportunity cost of S2,499,999. If interest rates arc t0%, Creditor loses S249,999 per year through delay. Manager, however, loses only one thin dime. It may be
true that each side does not have a credible exit threat, in other words, that each side gets more from
an instantaneous fifty-fifty split, but the two sides do not have equal patience.
Baird and Picker do not see that patience is a function of interest rates and capital at stake. In
the above example, interest rates are the same, but opportunity costs radically diverge. Hence, the
parties are not equally patient to reach a bargain. See Baird & Picker, supra note 2, at 343 (showing
that parties with equal capital stakes and different interest rates arc not equally patient).
111
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that Firm cannot reorganize unless going concern value is more than twice
the amount of liquidation value. As Baird and Picker recognize, where VM
< WM + Vc, the parties are better off liquidating the firm. 111 Therefore,
whenever Ve > .5VM• reorganization is impossible, even though the parties sacrifice economic rents by their inability to reorganize.
If Baird and Picker follow this assumption through, the parties
would always either liquidate Firm or divide it in half. VM - Vc would
never constitute Manager's share of Firm, unless . 5VM = Vc, by some
perverse coincidence. Yet in Baird and Picker's Model One, VM - V c is
precisely Manager's share when Vc > .5VM- 114
111
Id. at 339.
"' Id. at 340, 344. To further complicate matters, Baird and Picker reverse field and imply that
Manager can always take VM as a wage. Yet, VM is the surplus after the payment of the wage.
According to this view , WM ~ 0 because VM - 0, in contrast to many other assertions in Baird and
Picker's article.
According to Baird and Picker:
Manager can (buy all the stock for new cash.] This limitation may prevent Manager from
enjoying the entire going-concern surplus because, given the contribution she must make,
she can enjoy the surplus only in the form of a wage that is higher than her alternative
wage elsewhere. There may be constraints (such as the wage ordinarily paid a manager of
such a firm) that limit how much money may be extracted from Firm in this form. Apart
from these constraints, however, the new value exception enables Manager to force Creditor to take a share of Firm equal to the liquidation value of Firm's assets.
Id . at 325; see also id. at 345 n.65 ("The need to inject cash restricts the ability of Manager to
capture the going-concern surplus because the surplus can be extracted only through the differential
between the wage she receives at Firm and the wage she could earn elsewhere."). The mysterious
passage quoted above seems to indicate that Manager cannot enjoy VM because Manager will pay
itself VM as a wage, in which case VM - 0. Baird and Picker illustrate the meaning of this statement
as follows:
[Suppose] Creditor has a security interest in all the assets of Firm [worth SIOO] . . ..
Assume that a reasonably capitalized firm would have a debt-equity ratio of 3-1. Under
the new value exception ... Manager would retain all the equity of Firm in return for
contributing S25 in new cash to Firm. Creditor would receive a note secured by all the
assets of Firm worth S75. It would also receive as a cash distribution the S25 that Manager gave to Firm in return for the equity interest ....
Actual cases arc more complicated. The assets might be worth ... S200 if Manager
stayed in place and worked for hc'r alternative wage. If we continue to assume that a debtequity ratio of 3- I is required, it might seem that Manager would need to put up S50 in
new cash, so that Creditor could receive S50 in cash and a note worth St 50. (But] Creditor
can insist only on receiving SIOO, the liquidation value of the collateral. Moreover, we can
put a value on Firm only after Manager's wage is taken into account and nothing requires
that Manager works for only her alternative wage. Assume, for example, that Manager
can be paid SIOO more than she would make elsewhere. Manager may be able to have the
court confirm a plan in which she retains the equity in return for a cash contribution of
S25. Creditor may be forced to settle for a note worih S7 5 and S25 in cash. The total
package is worth SIOO, the liquidation value of the assets. The equity is worth only S25,
the amount Manager contributes in cash, because Firm is worth only SIOO after the wages
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Accumulating Income

Another problem with the "equal patience" assumption is that Baird
and Picker assume that VM stays fixed over time.115 But VM represents
going concern value. Going concern value is only the present value of
Firm's expected future income, so undistributed income must be accumulating in Firm. As a result, the value of Firm is growing. This income
may belong to Creditor directly if it represents proceeds of Creditor's collateral.116 As such, the income is part of Vc· If it is not part of Vc, the
income belongs to the bankrupt estate. Because Creditor is the largest unsecured creditor by virtue of her infinitely large deficit claim, even unencumbered income belongs to Creditor, not to Manager. As a result, and
contrary to what Baird and Picker maintain, 117 Creditor benefits from
delay and gains bargaining leverage. The absolute priority rule excludes
Manager from this income.
Baird and Picker think the opposite is true. They opine that the
pressure is on Creditor to reach an early bargain with Manager because
"Creditor enjoys no return on the assets ... for the length of the negotiations."118 In fact, cash accumulates and VM grows, providing Creditor
(and not Manager) with a return for delay. It appears that Baird and
Picker forgot that Creditor has an unsecured deficit claim Creditor can
use to its advantage in the bargaining process.
If Creditor's claim is infinitely large, Creditor is not only the dominant secured creditor but also the dominant unsecured creditor. As such,
Creditor will benefit from delay and Manager will not. 119 Although Baird
to Manager are taken into account . . . .

Id. at 327-28. What Baird and Picker seem to be saying is that the Manager must extract VM in the
guise of wages. Otherwise, the unsecured deficit of Creditor takes priority over VM and over Manager,
who is only a shareholder. But this assertion merely states that VM exists by virtue of Manager's
choice. If Manager can always expropriate VM by awarding itself wages worth V,w, then why does
Manager ever give .5VM to Creditor?
The above analysis by Baird and Picker vitiates nearly every part of their article because Manager never needs to bargain with Creditor to confiscate VM ' The only issue is whether Creditor has
' the right ·10 VC or not, in order to block this expropriation.
110
Id. at 334.
119
11 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1988) (preserving proceeds for secured creditors).
117
"The central premise of the bargaining model ... is that each party prefers agreement sooner
rather than later and that this moves the parties toward agreement." Baird & Picker, supra note 2, at
334-35 (footnote omitted).
m Id . at 320.
ut Manager continues to receive a salary during delay, but Baird and Picker assume that this
salary is below market value, so that receipt of the salary is, in fact, realization of a loss. Id. at 320
n.23.
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and Picker wish, for simplicity purposes, to make Creditor and Manager
equally patient in holding out for any bargain, equal patience is logically
possible only if unencumbered cash does not accumulate in Firm pending
the bargain between Creditor and Manager. Yet cash flow is precisely the
basis upon which VM is founded. If no expectation of income exists, then
VM = 0 and there is no surplus to split.

F.

Is It a Game?

According to Eric Rasmusen, "(g]ame theory is concerned with the
actions of individuals who are conscious that their actions affect each
other.... Game theory is not useful when decisions are made that ignore
the reactions of others or treat them as impersonal market forces." 120 It is
not entirely clear whether Baird and Picker presented a true game theory
in their article. If they did, the game is so obvious that they should have
dispensed with game theory altogether. If they had, they simply could
have asserted that cram down does not exist and that the new value exception allows for a cash-out at liquidation values. Such propositions would
merit unalloyed scorn if left unmystified by game theory.
Baird and Picker describe their model as one in which Manager either (1) exits and takes WM, or (2) extends an offer to share VM with
Creditor. 121 WM constitutes wages voluntarily foregone, thereby increasing
VM· As previously shown, a rational Manager would never voluntarily
take a pay cut to swell the size of VM because Manager generally splits
VM with Creditor. A rational Manager therefore makes sure that

WM> 0.
If WM

= 0, then Manager never chooses between exit and offer because exit promises no gain. Instead, Manager always offers Creditor a
share of VM and stipulates the amount of the offer in advance. For example, in Model One, Manager offers . 5VM when Vc < .5VM and offers Vc
when Vc > .5VM· In Model Two, Manager always offers . 5VM• and so
on.
According to Baird and Picker, Creditor has three moves in response
to the inevitable offer by Manager. Creditor can (1) accept the offer, (2)
counteroffer, or (3) if legally permitted, exit by repossessing Firm's assets.112 Because Manager's offer always covers the exit option, when it
exists, Creditor is always indifferent between accepting and exiting.
110
111
111

supra note t , at 21.
Baird & Picker, supra note 2, at 330.
Id. at 333.
RASMUSEN ,
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Therefore, it is possible to eliminate the option of exiting from the discussion altogether.
This elimination limits Creditor's strategy set to acceptance or rejection-counteroffer. Rejection never occurs in the model. Instead, Creditor
always accepts. Why? According to Baird and Picker:
In a world of complete information, the parties reach an agreement in the
first period. Manager ... makes a proposal just attractive enough so that
Creditor is better off taking the proposal than making a counteroffer that,
while giving it a larger share, takes longer to put in place and hence is
worth less to it. 118

Baird and Picker do not expressly articulate why Creditor cannot
make a successful counteroffer that compensates Creditor for lost time.
The most plausible reason that Creditor does not counteroffer is that
Creditor, who has complete knowledge, knows that Manager will not accept the counteroffer and will repeatedly return with its original offer.
Given Creditor's knowledge of the futility of a counteroffer, Creditor
chooses to accept now because, once discounted to present value, the future offer is worth less than today's offer.
If these notions are the key to making the "game" work, Creditor's
only real option is to accept whatever offer Manager makes. This offer
must equal Vc when Creditor has the right to foreclose. When no such
right exists, or when Manager offers more than Vc, Manager's offer always determines Creditor's share of VM· No theory explains the origin of
Manager's offer, yet Creditor must accept it. The Baird and Picker
model, if in fact it is a game theory, presents us with a very simple game
indeed - one suitable for age two to kindergarten. 124 It is one in which
each party has a dominant strategy against the other. Accordingly, only
one very obvious Nash equilibrium exists. 1211

,.. Id. at 335.
Baird and Picker acknowledge, to some extent, that their "game" is nothing but a "dead
dog." They write: "Perhaps the most striking - and in some ways the most disappointing - feature
of the perfect information model is that immtdiatt agreement is reached if any agreement is reached
at all. The essential stationariness of the model generates this result." Id. They also suggest that this
problem equates their model with a pre-packaged chapter 11 plan, as if that trendy device is not the
subject of spirited bargaining. Id.
111
Since there is only one Nash equilibrium, Baird and Picker should have dispensed with the
requirement of subgame perfectness. This assumption is useful to narrow down the solution to games
where there are multiple Nash equilibria. Su supra text accompanying notes 100-102.
114

